In this issue of Neuron, Clapcote et al. examine mice containing missense mutations of the DISC1 gene, a locus associated with major mental illness in at least one large Scottish family. Genetic manipulation of mouse homologs of genes implicated in the etiology of psychiatric disorders is a promising avenue of research, but also one that is fraught with interpretative difficulties.
A major theme in neuroscience and neuropsychiatric research has been the identification of mutant genes leading to neurologic diseases followed by the subsequent creation of animal, frequently mouse, models of these diseases through genetic manipulation. The rationale behind this research approach is that these models will provide insight into the underlying biology of the human disease and offer a test bed for the development of therapies for that disease. From the outset, as a community, we need to acknowledge that, so far, no therapies for any neuropsychiatric disease have been developed by these means. And although we believe we have gained further understanding about the diseases through studying them this way, in the absence of therapies for the human conditions, this derived knowledge has not been rigorously tested. Undoubtedly, even for the Mendelian disease variants for which this approach has been most extensively applied, such as Huntington's and Alzheimer's diseases, the animal models that have been developed only partially mimic the human condition (Bates and Hockly 2003; Duff and Suleman 2004) , and the description of these models as ''Huntington's mice'' or ''Alzheimer's mice'' in both the scientific and popular literature has been a disservice to unraveling the complexity of the problem. However, at least in these conditions the relevance of the models has two anchors: the certainty of Mendelian inheritance and the pathologic similarity of the models to the human disease; and this perhaps bodes well for their future utility in treatment research.
In addressing the major psychiatric syndromes, such as mood disorders and psychoses, additional problems for research are present. They are uniquely human conditions; they appear to represent extremes of the normal spectrum of human behavior; they have no defining pathology; and, while frequently familial, they usually do not exhibit Mendelian patterns of inheritance.
The use of mouse models in psychiatry has been and will always be limited to examining a specific dimension of the psychiatric disorder (Einat, 2007; Tordjman et al., 2007) , rather than being able to test the disease entity as a whole. Because psychiatric disorders are composed of lists of symptoms, many of which are nonspecific and overlap with those of other psychiatric disorders, a mouse model may be able to mimic some observable behaviors, but the attribution of a specific behavior to a human emotion or cognitive state cannot be made. Reasons for a psychiatric patient's behavior-for example, lack of participation in regular, pleasurable activities-can be interpreted in multiple ways by an observer, including avoidance due to anxiety, paranoid delusions, low mood, or loss of motivation. Discerning the reasons for the uncharacteristic behavior depends on a reliable and objective reporter, yet impaired judgment and reasoning and denial are also symptoms of psychiatric disorders, making the true internal states of a patient even more difficult to know. These already difficult considerations in human assessments can never be applied to the analysis of mouse models of psychiatric illness.
What is helpful is when mouse modelers describe, as Clapcote and colleagues do herein with DISC1 variants , the observable behavior being depicted (for example, excess motoric acivitity) rather than generalizing it to a specific psychiatric disorder (for example, schizophrenia). That behavior, in fact, may be observed in many psychiatric disorders (excess motoric behavior in bipolar disorder, autism, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder as examples), and in such cases this feature would not define a specific etiology of disease or a future therapy.
Molecular genetic analyses of the major psychiatric syndromes have not yet yielded risk loci that are universally accepted (DeLisi and Faraone, 2006) . However, in an interesting and large Scottish family, a balanced translocation at 1q42 segregates significantly, but not perfectly, with a high incidence of affective disorders and schizophrenia (Blackwood et al., 2001 ). This balanced translocation disrupts two genes, named Disrupted In Schizophrenia 1 (DISC1) and DISC2 (Millar et al., 2000) . DISC2 appears to be an antisense transcript involved in the regulation of DISC1 expression. While DISC1's function is not known, it is a large, brain-expressed cytoplasmic protein that is believed to interact with several other neuronal proteins, including phosphodiesterase 4 (PDE4B), whose cAMP hydrolyzing activity it is believed to modulate.
The evidence tying the disruption, and thus haploinsufficiency, of DISC1 to the psychiatric symptoms in the family is reasonably convincing, although it is difficult formally to rule out longer-range genetic effects of the translocation or the possibility of a chance association, especially in the context of documented nonpenetrance in the family. The possibility of a chance association would be ruled out unequivocally by the identification and characterization of other families with DISC1 mutations. The genetic evidence tying the DISC locus to mood disorders and psychosis in the general population, while generally positive (Muir et al., 2006) , is less convincing and may be confounded by publication bias.
With this background, Clapcote et al. (2007) have identified and characterized three mouse DISC1 mutants: two missense variants created by the ENU chemical mutagenesis program (Coghill et al., 2002) and one naturally occurring, out-of-frame deletion close to the C terminus of the protein (Clapcote and Roder, 2006) . The missense lines were biochemically and behaviorally assessed in both heterozygote and homozygote states. The missense mutations had no discernable effects on the protein levels, and the C-terminal deletion was reported, in other experiments (Ishizuka et al., 2007) , to only affect one splice isoform of the protein. One of the missense mutations, Q31L, appeared to be associated with reduced PDE4B activity and to lead to a smaller brain volume, decreased latent inhibition, decreased sociability, and prolonged forced swim immobility. These behavioral features are reminiscent, given the caveats discussed above, of the impaired processing, anhedonia, and depression seen in the psychotic and mood disorders. Furthermore, these features partially responded to haloperidol and clozapine (well-established treatments for schizophrenia and other forms of psychoses) and bupropion (used mainly for depression and smoking cessation). The other missense mutation, L100P, also had a reduction in brain volume, but this was not associated with a reduction in PDE4B activity. This mutation was associated with deficits in latent and prepulse inhibition and with an increase in horizontal activity. The deficit in prepulse inhibition was reversed by the PDE4 inhibitor, rolipram, which has been examined in a few small trials as an antidepressant, but not pursued due to intolerable side effects (Berton and Nestler, 2006) .
These data are generally consistent with the view that genetic modification of the DISC1 locus leads to behavioral outcomes that may correspond to traits or abnormalities observed in psychiatric disorders. However, clearly, it behooves us to be cautious in their interpretation. In addition to the above caveats inherent in modeling psychiatric disorders, the two observations that the mutations (1) have different and complex biochemical, anatomical, and behavioral effects; and (2) are missense and essentially recessive in effect, rather than destructive and essentially dominant with incomplete penetrance (as in the Scottish family), favor a conservative interpretation especially since the prevalent mouse DISC1 deletion variant has, at most, subtle behavioral effects even when homozygote. In addition, it would be helpful for us to have a more comprehensive description of the clinical profile, phenomenology, and treatment response of the original family to form a basis of comparison for these intriguing animal experiments.
Psychiatric illnesses are highly prevalent, devastating to the affected individuals and their families, and enormously costly to society. We have a pressing obligation to better understand their etiology and develop strategies to reduce their incidence and improve their course and severity. Mouse models, such as these, may be a way forward, but we must use them cautiously and be wary not to only study mice and to lose sight of the human condition. It should further humble us to realize that our current therapies for these disorders have been discovered serendipitously and through development of these initial happy accidents.
